Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Liability:
An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs
The Hon. William A. Dreier

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case of Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,' the New
Jersey

Supreme

Court

determined

that

a

prescription

drug

manufacturer might be held liable to consumers based on direct-toconsumer advertising that fails to warn of significant dangers. The
court, however, in an opinion authored by Justice O'Hern, imposed
stringent limitations on this newly authorized products liability cause
of action. In stating the requirements for this new claim, the court

also shed light upon the proofs necessary to sustain existing warning
defect causes of action under the governing NewJersey statute.'
In reaching its conclusion, the majority recognized, but refused
to apply, the statutory learned intermediary rule embodied in New
Jersey's Products Liability Act (NJPLA)

.

Although the court's new

rule may have salutary purposes, Justice Pollock's dissenting opinion
observed that the

court should have been

constrained

by the

Partner, Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, PA.; Presiding Judge, Superior Court
of New Jersey, Appellate Division (Retired); B.S., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; J.D., Columbia Law School.
161 N.J. 1, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
2 See id. at 24, 734 A.2d at 1259. The NewJersey Supreme Court's determination
of manufacturer liability in Perez is directly adverse to the federal courts' treatment of
the direct-to-consumer advertising issue concerning the Norplant system. See generally
In re Norplant Contraceptive Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding
application of the learned intermediary doctrine to plaintiffs claims resulting from
use of the Norplant contraceptive).
SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C4 (West 1999).
See id. ("If the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device
or food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and
Drug Administration . . . a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or
instruction is adequate."); see also Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediay
Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related
Injuy, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1345-46 (1999) (writing that "the [learned
intermediary] rule states that drug manufacturers must adequately warn only the
medical community of the risks associated with the use of a prescription drug").
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language of the NJPLA.5 The NJPLA states that the adequacy of a
warning in a prescription-drug or medical-device case is to be
determined under the learned intermediary rule.
The NJPLA
further defines an adequate warning in terms of the knowledge of the
consuming public, except that "in the case of prescription drugs, [the
standard that must be taken into account includes] the characteristics
of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the prescribing
physician. 7 Likewise, the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee
Statement, which the statute requires be consulted in its
interpretation, provides unambiguously that in the case of
prescription drugs, the required adequate warning is owed only to
the physician.8 When the statute and the committee statement are
read together, as the Legislature directed, it is hard to quarrel with
the position thatJustice Pollock takes in dissent.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also could have reached the
same end by different means. The court was not confined to the
theories of a defective product claim governed by the NJPLA.9 The
principles of section 9 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (Restatement (Third)) recognize the possibility of parallel
claims alleging both fraud and misrepresentation, and, thus, would
permit an action to proceed against the manufacturer on those
common-law theories.'0
When faced with a similar legislative
preemption concerning cigarette label warnings, the United States
Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc." determined that
claims of fraud or misrepresentation are not encompassed by the
preempted warning claim. The Perez court could have utilized the
same approach. In fact, the majority, in response to the stinging
criticism of Justice Pollock's dissent, 3 stated that the principle
5 See Perez, 161 N.J. at 33-42, 734 A.2d at 1264-69 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-4
(West 1999).

Id,
a See N.J.
7

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A.58C-l(a) (West 1999). The statute states that "[tihe

Legislature finds that ...committee statements that may be adopted or included in
the legislative history of this act shall be consulted in the interpretation and
construction of this act." Id.
9 See genera/!y N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A58C-2 (West
1999).
10See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrlY § 9 (1997) ("One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who, in
connection with the sale of a product, makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent
misrepresentation of material fact concerning the product is subject to liability for
harm to persons or property caused by the misrepresentation.").
1 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
12

See id. at 530-31.

IsIn the words of Justice Pollock's dissenting opinion, "the majority rejects the
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underpinning its holding was that the learned intermediary rule
contained in the statute "does not confer on pharmaceutical
manufacturers a license to mislead or deceive consumers when those
manufacturers elect to exercise their right to advertise their product
directly to such consumers." If the genuine focus of the majority's
opinion was to prevent fraud or misrepresentation, the court need
not have ridden roughshod over the statute in order to achieve its
goals. This seemingly plaintiff-friendly approach, however, is blunted
by the stringent new rules imposed for a claim of a warning defect
based upon direct-to-consumer advertising.
The Perez decision does not absolve the manufacturer from
giving an adequate warning to the prescribing physician, but merely
creates a separate common-law duty to warn the patient who is the
target of consumer advertising. Based on the New Jersey Supreme
Court's imposition of liability for direct-to-consumer marketing, one
might infer that there is now a decidedly pro-plaintiff shift in the law
on this subject.' 5 In the past, New Jersey has been a bellwether for
such changes.
But, despite the apparently pro-plaintiff language of the Perez
opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court has announced a rather
conservative rule. If, as this Article posits, the net effect of the court's
new rule merely substitutes the very stringent Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) disclosure requirements for what might have
been either a fraud, misrepresentation, or adequate warning to
physicians standard under New Jersey law, there will be little real
benefit to plaintiffs. This Article will explore the court's reasoning
against the background of New Jersey case law, the governing FDA
Legislature's endorsement of the learned intermediary doctrine as set forth in [the
NJPLA]. The majority opinion sustains itself only by ignoring the plain language of
an unambiguous statute.., and by substituting its own policy preferences for that of
the Legislature." Perez, 161 N.J. at 33, 734 A.2d at 1264 (Pollock,J., dissenting).
14
Id. at 32, 734 A.2d at 1264. The court agreed with the appellate division's
finding that the statutory term "physician" is inclusive of all prescribing health-care
providers. See id. at 9 n.3, 734 A.2d at 1250 n.3.
15
See, e.g., Noelle Collins, It Got Under Their Skin, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1999, at 36 ("Perez
. . . opens the door for plaintiffs to sue the makers of Norplant because the
contraceptive was marketed directly to them, rather than physicians."); Julie Brienza,
N.J. CourtFinds Exception to Learned Intermediay Doctrine,TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 94 ("In a
victory for plaintiffs, the NewJersey Supreme Court has found that manufacturers of
the Norplant contraceptive . . . must make warnings of potentially dangerous side
effects clear to consumers, not just to doctors."); Why the Learned Intermediay Doctrine
Continues to Apply, FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1999, at 60 ("As long as this 'central feature
that defines the marketing of prescription drugs' exists, the learned intermediary
doctrine does not diminish merely because a manufacturer advertises its products
directly to the consumer.").
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regulations, and the Restatement (Third). The Article also will
examine the potential national effect of Perez should it become the
standard by which other courts determine issues of liability for directto-consumer advertising.
I. ANALYSIS OF PEREZ V. WYETH lABORATORIES, INC.'
The Perez case was a multiplaintiff suit that involved the Norplant
contraceptive drug and delivery system, a "reversible contraceptive
that prevents pregnancy for up to five years."'" Wyeth Laboratories
markets Norplant in the United States. 8 Plaintiffs alleged that Wyeth
failed to warn of possible side effects of Norplant, including "weight
gain, headaches, dizziness, nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue,
facial hair growth, numbness in the arms and legs, irregular
menstruation, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety and nervousness, vision
problems, anemia, mood swings and depression, high blood pressure,
and removal complications that resulted in scarring."' 9
Most
complications, however, resulted from removal of the Norplant
system.20 Plaintiffs further alleged that Wyeth participated in massive
marketing attempts to promote Norplant, which included
advertisements on television and in women's magazines, such as
Cosmopolitan, Glamour, and Mademoiselle.2 1 These advertisements did
not warn of any dangers associated with Norplant.2
The court began the analysis by explaining that regulation of

16

The New Jersey Supreme Court decided Perez just as a Seton Hall Law Review

article on the subject was submitted for publication. See William A. Dreier,
Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Drug and Medical Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. Rzv. 258 (1999).
The Article therefore
mentioned only briefly the new rules governing direct-to-consumer advertising
liability for prescription drugs and medical devices. See id. at 262-63. The Article
noted the earlier expectation that the comments to section 6(d) of the Restatement
(Third), namely, the statement concerning possible development of liability for
direct-to-consumer advertising, would have had little, if any, effect in NewJersey. See
id. The NJPLA and the accompanying Committee Statements required only that an
adequate warning be given to the prescribing physician. Under the NJPLA,
prescription drug manufacturers should have been shielded from such claims.
However, the NewJersey Supreme Court decided to the contrary.
17 Perez, 161 N.J. at 5, 734 A.2d at 1247. The status of
the plaintiffs as bellwether
parties caused the court to address the issue of direct-to-consumer advertising,
notwithstanding the fact that none of the named plaintiffs had seen any of the
advertisements.
18 See id. at n.1.
19 Id. at 6, 734 A.2d
at 1248.
20 See id.
21 Seeid.
22 Seid.
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advertisements concerning prescription drugs is conferred upon the
FDA pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.23 The FDA
regulations govern "advertisements in published journals, magazines,
other periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast
[through] media such as radio, television, and telephone
communications systems."2 If a company fails to comply with the
FDA regulations, any drugs that the company distributes, as well as
those still in the channels of commerce, will then be deemed
"misbranded," with all of the negative ramifications attendant upon
this designation.2 The court also discussed other FDA regulations,
including the "brief summary" requirementr and the Draft Guidance
that
"specifically
addresses
consumer-directed
broadcast
television
and
telephone
such
as radio,
advertisement
communications."2 7 The court noted that, in general, compliance
with FDA regulations does not confer a conclusive presumption of
adequacy, but "serve[s] as compelling evidence that a manufacturer
satisfied its duty to warn the physician about potentially harmful side
effects of its product."28 The court, therefore, determined that
compliance with FDA procedures was presumptive proof of an
adequate warning.2
The court's determination may have departed from the thenprevailing law. Under NewJersey's evidence rules, the establishment
of "a [rebuttable] presumption discharges the burden of proving
evidence as to a fact."3° Thus, if evidence is introduced that tends to
disprove the presumption, the presumption vanishes, and the litigant
is left only with whatever natural inference may be drawn.3 ' The
holding in Perez, however, raises this rebuttable presumption above
See Perez, 161 N.J. at 22, 734 A.2d at 1258 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)
(1990)).
2
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(I)(1) (1990).
25 See id. § 202.1
(k).
26 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (3) (1990). The court noted that § 352(n)
(3) requires
that "all advertising must include a description of 'side effects, contraindications and
effectiveness as shall be required in [the] regulations.'" Perez, 161 N.J. at 22, 734
A.2d at 1258 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352 (n) (3) (1990)). The regulations require that the
"brief summary" include all risk information in a product's package labeling. See 21
C.F.R. § 202 (e)(1), (e)(iii) (1990).
27 See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,172 (Aug. 12, 1997).
The Draft Guidance provides that
advertisements must contain a "major statement" of the principal risks of the drug.
See id.
2S Perez, 161 N.J. at 24, 734 A.2d at
1259.
29 See id.
0 N.J. R. EVID.
301.
31 See Ahn v. Kim, 145 N.J. 423, 439, 678 A.2d 1073, 1081 (1996) (citing Ford
Motor Co.v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312, 604 A.2d 580, 591 (1992)).
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the disappearing presumption described in New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 301, but somewhat below an irrebuttable presumption that
would have the effect of a rule of law. 2
The NewJersey Supreme Court used strong language to describe
this newly crafted presumption for direct-to-consumer prescription
drug advertising cases. The court stated that "[ffor all practical
purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of afteracquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA
standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims."" The court
initially discussed the presumption of adequacy contained in the
NJPLA for warnings that have received FDA premarketing approval.m
The court previously had analyzed this issue in Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories,Inc.35 (Feldman II), holding "that the presumption in [the
NJPLA] was no defense to an inadequate warning claim."6 Building
on this decision, the Perez court determined that satisfaction of the
FDA regulations was "compelling evidence that a manufacturer satisfied
its duty to warn the physician.""7 The court then resolved that "the
same rebuttable presumption should apply when a manufacturer
complies with FDA ... requirements. " m

Prior to Perez, the common understanding of the statutory
presumption of adequacy flowed from Feldman II and was to be
governed by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 301. The Perez court
implicitly, without mentioning the New Jersey Rules of Evidence,
compared and contrasted the two presumptions with respect to
consumer advertising. The statutory presumption of the NJPLA
would disappear if New Jersey Rule of Evidence 301 were applied, but
in this instance it is to be considered "compelling evidence" under
the court's new rule. Evidence of compliance with FDA standards in
direct-to-consumer advertisement claims will be "virtually dispositive"
of the plaintiffs case."
In general, an irrebuttable presumption "is one in which proof of basic fact
renders the existence of the presumed fact conclusive." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1186 (6th ed. 1990).
32

33

Perez, 161 N.J. at 25, 734 A.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
See id. at 24, 734 A.2d at 1259 (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West

1999)).
35 125 N.J. 117, 592 A.2d 1176 (1991). This was the second time the Feldman case
had reached the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J.
429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
36

William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and New

Jersg Law-Not Quite Perfect Together, 50 RuTGERs L. REv. 2059, 2103 (1998).
Perez, 161 N.J. at 24, 734 A.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
38

Id.

See id. at 25, 734 A.2d at 1259.
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Is the New Jersey Supreme Court also attempting to provide new
insight concerning the statutory presumption discussed in Feldman II,
as well as defining new standards for direct-to-consumer advertising?
It appears so. A careful reading of Perez shows that its language and
that of Feldman /Hcan indeed be harmonized, but only by recognizing
that the court must have intended that the usual standards of New
Jersey Rule of Evidence 301 are, in part, inapplicable to drug
warnings, at least insofar as compliance with FDA requirements is
concerned. In Perez, the court discussed Feldman II, in which it had
previously stated the effect of the presumption in the NJPLA to be
4 The Feldman II court applied the plain language
"less clear."o
of the
NJPLA that created the presumption of the adequacy for a warning
based upon compliance with the FDA's premarketing approval .
This appeared to be in accordance with New Jersey Rule of Evidence
301 principles. At the time of the 1991 Feldman II opinion, however,
there had been a change in the governing FDA regulation that was
effective at the time that the drug was being prescribed.4 Originally,
the FDA did not require a new warning unless there was "unequivocal
factual evidence of adverse reaction in man. " 4
By 1991, the FDA required a manufacturer to warn of "possible
adverse side effects as soon as reasonably feasible and based upon
'reasonable evidence."' The Feldman /Hcourt stated that its decision
was driven by the language of the earlier governing regulation.4 If
there had been an FDA determination that no reasonable evidence of
possible adverse side effects existed under the new regulatory regime,
the Feldman II court may have given greater deference to the FDA's
action, or lack thereof. Unfortunately, the Feldman H court made no
definitive pronouncement on the effect of the new federal
regulations. Until Perez, the effect of the statutory presumption in
such cases remained in question. There clearly was no federal
preemption; however, there also was little guidance to the bench, bar,
or prescription drug industry.
Notwithstanding the usual treatment of a presumption under
New Jersey Rule of Evidence 301, the Perez court determined that
compliance with FDA regulations serves as "compelling evidence that
a manufacturer satisfied its duty to warn the physician about
See Feldman II, 125 N.J. at 157, 592 A.2d at 1197.

40

41

See i.
Seeid.

42
3Id.

5

Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1990)).
See id.
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potentially harmful side effects of its product. " 4 Furthermore, the
presumptions discussed in both Perez and Feldman II must be
appraised under the same standard in view of the court's clear
4
language that "the same rebuttable presumption should apply." 1
The conclusion becomes inescapable that the presumptions of
adequacy afforded to a manufacturer's compliance with FDA
requirements in a usual drug warning case both under Feldman II
(with modem regulations controlling) and under Perez are of greater
evidentiary weight than is the customary New Jersey Rule of Evidence
301 presumption. A manufacturer's compliance with FDA
regulations, however, is clearly less than an irrebuttable presumption.
Assuming the foregoing as the New Jersey Supreme Court's
intention, the enhanced presumption in Perez (that the warning was
adequate if it complied with FDA regulations) becomes more
understandable.
The court then underlined the effect of this
enhanced presumption when it stated that "[f]or all practical
purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of afteracquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA
standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims."** The court
reiterated this principle when it concluded the discussion with the
statement that compensatory damages will be reserved to "those rare
cases where the presumption is overcome."49 Neither of these
comments, however, were confined to direct-to-consumer advertising.
This newly defined duty to consumers is certainly not an
absolute liability rule. In fact, this duty is decidedly pro-defendant.
The manufacturer's duty is satisfied "by compliance with FDA
regulations [that will help] to ensure that manufacturers are not
made guarantors against remotely possible, but not scientifically
verifiable side-effects of prescription drugs, a result that could have a
'significant anti-utilitarian effect." ' 50 This industry-protective effect is
reinforced by the court's citation of the definitive article on this issue
by Professor Michael D. Green."t
Comment e to section 6(d) of the Restatement (Third) left the
issue of liability for direct-to-consumer advertising "to developing case

46

Peru, 161 N.J. at 24, 734 A.2d at 1259.

47 Id.

Id. at 25, 734 A-2d at 1259.
9

50

Id.

Id. (quoting Feldman II, 125 N.J. at 162, 592 A.2d at 1200) (Garibaldi, J.,

dissenting).
See id. (citing Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:
51

Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 461, 466-67 (1997)).
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law." 2 The Restatement (Third)'s comment cross-references section
4(b), which governs the effect on liability of compliance with an
applicable governmental product safety statute or regulation.'" The
Restatement (Third) posits that such compliance usually is evidential
of due care, but has no preclusive effect.5' Of course, as the
comments make clear, the rule is applicable only in the absence of a
preemptive statute or regulation.6 The principle merely establishes
"a floor of safety" applicable in most cases.m
While the manufacturer's defense of compliance will not be
absolute under Perez, the defense outlined in the case is formidable.
This treatment, however, is not antithetical to the Restatement
(Third). Comment e to section 4 recognizes that compliance with
safety standards set by particular statutes or regulations may require
stronger protection for the manufacturer. Compliance with other
standards may be given little or no weight. The factors listed by the
comment are (a) whether the standards are of recent promulgation;
(b) whether the standards "address the very issue of product design
or warning presented in the case before the court"; (c) whether the
"the deliberative process that led to the safety standard was full, fair,
and thorough and reflected substantial expertise"; and (d) whether
"the deliberative process that led to the safety standard with which
the defendant's product complies was tainted by the supplying of
false information to, or the withholding of information from, the
agency that promulgated the standard or certified or approved the
product. " 5 The Perez court applied these principles, and on every
point the FDA-required procedures militated for the practically
preclusive effect granted by the court.

52

5s

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILnY § 6(d) cmt. e (1997).
See id § 4. Section 4 states in part:
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate
instructions or warnings:
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety
standard or administrative regulation is properly considered in
determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks
sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance
does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.

Id.

see id.

See id. § 4 cmt. e.
5

See id.

57

Id.
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II. POSTSALE WARNINGS
Perez provides that, at least in New Jersey, a manufacturer, by
advertising its products directly to the consumer, undertakes a duty to
inform potential patients concerning later pharmaceutical
developmentsss Both New Jersey law and the prevailing law in the
United States recognize the duty of a seller of a product to warn
consumers of dangers involved, even if discoverable after the product
has left the manufacturer's hands." The Restatement (Third) rule in
this regard is also applicable to the marketing of prescription drugs
under section 6. In fact, in comment b to section 10, the Reporters
state that, as to "prescription drugs and devices, courts traditionally
impose a continuing duty of reasonable care to test and monitor after
sale to discover product-related risks." 60 Section 10 also requires that
the recipients of the warning must be reasonably identifiable.'
In
reality, however, when a manufacturer has sold millions of units of a
product with unrecorded consumer sales, individual contact will be
impossible. The Restatement (Third) comments recognize the use of
the public media dependent upon the seriousness of the risks
involved. Also, if a manufacturer may reasonably assume that the
consumers are aware of the risks, the manufacturer need not issue a
See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. at 24-25, 734 A.2d at 1259.

59 See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., Inc., 97 N.J. 429, 434, 479 A.2d 374, 376 (1984)

(holding that drug manufacturers have a duty to warn customers of dangers of which
the manufacturer knew or should have known on the basis of reasonably obtainable
or available knowledge). The Restatement (Third) also addresses postsale warnings.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiBiLny § 10 (1997). Section 10
provides:
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused
by the seller's failure to provide a warning after the time of sale or
distribution of a product if a reasonable person in the seller's position
would provide such a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in a seller's position would provide a warning
after the time of sale if:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the
product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property;
and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be
identified and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the
risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on
by those to whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of
providing a warning.
Id.
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10 cmt.
b (1997).
61 See id. § 10.
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warning. The risk may be apparent from the product itself, or it may
be apparent through publicity. When the product is a prescription
drug, however, pharmacists' records are usually available and provide
a direct conduit to the consumers.
Lastly, section 10(b) (4) and comment i note that there must be
risk.6
a balancing of the cost of the warning against the extent of the
This comment shows clearly that this is an objective balancing to
Nowhere in section 10, its
which a negligence rule applies.
comments, or in the federal statute or regulations is there any
indication that a manufacturer may legally balance the adverse public
relations effect of giving the warning. In other words, a manufacturer
may not balance its good will against potential consumer injuries.
Thus, the costs described in the comment are the "expenditures" for
public or individual notice and not any lessening of the product's
goodwill.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Perez recognized that the
failure to disseminate after-acquired knowledge constitutes an
exception to the principle that compliance with the FDA disclosure
standards is virtually dispositive of any claim regarding inadequate
warnings.3 Also excepted is a situation in which the manufacturer
has deceived the FDA. In this case, punitive damages and, of course,
compensatory damages, are permitted.6
III. DIREcr-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE

If the legal community is to assume that the court truly means
that compliance with the FDA standards is "virtually dispositive" of a
plaintiffs claim, the direct-to-consumer advertising standards must be
examined in detail. For example, if compliance constitutes a
probable defense, a plaintiff who does not meet his burden on this
issue will likely have his case dismissed on a summary judgment
motion once the defendant produces evidence of such compliance.
A manufacturer can protect itself by submitting its consumer
62 See id. § 10(b)(4) cmt. i. This principle is also recognized in title 21, §
201.57(e) of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1990).
SeePerz, 161 N.J. at 25, 734 A.2d at 1259.
64 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-5(c) (West 1999).
The punitive damage
protection in title 2A, section 58C-5(c) of the NewJersey Statutes is broader than the
adequate warning protection provided in section 58C-4 of the same title. The
punitive damage protection extends to a "drug or device or food or food additive
which . .. (is] subject to premarket approval or licensure by the [FDA] . . . or is
generally recognized as safe and effective .... " Id. The general warning protection
is given only to a "drug or device or food or food additive ... approved or prescribed
by the [FDA]." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2kA58C-5 (West 1999).
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advertising to the FDA for prepublication comment.6 In fact, as
noted earlier, a failure to comply can result in the product being
labeled misbranded.66 Thus, with the exception of claims involving
postapproval knowledge regarding new problems that should have
been reported and made part of the advertised warnings, a drug
manufacturer that complies with FDA requirements may easily be
protected from liability.
The FDA standards are minute and definite. Congress requires
that manufacturers, packers, and distributors (also called "sponsors")
that advertise prescription drugs or biological products disclose in
their advertisements certain information about the products' uses
and risks, and, in particular, "information in brief summary relating
to side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness." 67 In FDA
language, this is the "brief summary" requirement, which the court in
Perez deemed a "misnomer considering that the summary is anything
but brief." 68
Print and broadcast advertising are subject to different
regulations.69 If the advertising is in print, the "brief summary" must
be included and must describe all of the risks explained in the
product's package labeling. 70 This information usually is found also
in the Physician'sDesk Reference (PDR). If the "brief summary" is stated
in consumer-friendly language, it must contain a reference to where
the full physician-directed text may be obtained-usually at a local
pharmacy, library, or physician's office. 7' Broadcast advertisements
merely must disclose a "major statement," such as an audio or visual
summary of the product's major risks.7 In addition, a broadcast
advertiser must either present the "brief summary" of the approved
or permitted package label or, alternatively, make an adequate
provision for dissemination of the labeling in connection with the
broadcast presentation." This "adequate provision" requirement can
be satisfied in a variety of ways, but the advertisement cannot be false

69

21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j)(4) (1990).
See id. § 202.1 (k).
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1990).
Per, 161 N.J. at 22, 734 A.2d at 1258.
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1990).

70

See id.

M

66
67

See Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Guidance for Industry (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
1804fnl.htm>.
See21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1990).
71

7

See id.
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or misleading in any respect.7 4 If the product is a prescription drug,
the advertisement must also inform the consumer that the drug is
available only by prescription through a prescribing health-care
professional who can decide whether the product is appropriate for
the particular patient. 7 The advertisement must present a fair
balance between information about the product's effectiveness and
the product's risks.6 The advertiser must include a thorough "major
statement," which must convey in consumer-friendly language all of
the product's most important risk information, including
information relevant to the indications for, and limitations on, the
77
product's use.
With respect to the "adequate provision" for dissemination of
the package labeling, the sponsor must use an approach that allows
most of a potentially diverse audience reasonably convenient access
through information on the product's label. 8 The regulations
recognize that many people have "only limited access to
technologically sophisticated outlets" for this information, such as the
Internet, and potential consumers often are uncomfortable with
requesting additional product information or even "being personally
identified in their search for" this information. 79 The Guidance for
Industry and the regulations provide an acceptable approach, which
includes offering the consumer a telephone procedure.
The
telephone procedure involves a toll-free number to obtain the
labeling information, where consumers will be given the choice of
having the labeling mailed to them or, alternatively, having the
labeling read to them over the telephone with the consumer
choosing from a selection of prerecorded labeling topics. 8
When the Internet is offered as a means of access, consumers
should be referred in the advertisement to an alternative for those
who have restricted access or who are uncomfortable discussing the
information or concerned about personal identification."
An
74

See id. § 202.1(e) (3) (i).

See Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Guidance for Industry (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
1804fnl.htm>.
76 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (5) (ii)
(1990).
7 See id. § 202.1(e) (3) (i).
78 See Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
75

Guidance for Industry (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
1804fn.htm>.
79 See id.

8oSee id.

81 Seeid.
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acceptable mechanism is to provide printed "advertisements
appearing concurrently in publications that reach" an audience
similar to that exposed to the broadcasts.
The broadcasts could
then reference at least one of these advertisements. The print
advertisement also "should supply a toll-free telephone number and
an address for further consumer access" for the full package
labeling.8 3
The mechanism chosen for providing this back-up access must
provide considerable information, at least in the form of the required
"brief summary," which is also included in the advertising text itself.
The advertisement should contain an Internet web page address for
access to the package labeling and should disclose that pharmacists
and health-care providers may supply "additional product
information to the consumer." 6 Another alternative for providing
private access to package information would be to ensure that
sufficient numbers of brochures containing the package labeling are
available in an assortment of publicly accessible locations, such as
grocery stores, pharmacies, doctors' offices, and public libraries. 2
Consumers should not be forced to travel beyond their normal range
of activities. This alternative is logistically feasible only when the
targets of the broadcast-advertising campaign are relatively limited.
An advertiser may also choose telephone advertisements that
make a product claim that communicates the product name and a
representation or suggestion relating to the product. In these
circumstances, the advertisements are subject to the same disclosure
requirements, but these requirements are less stringent than are the
requirements for television or radio broadcasts.86 The consumer, by
participating in the telephone call, has "indicated his willingness to
discuss the topic or receive [the additional information]

."

8

Thus,

fewer sources of the information need be disclosed to constitute an
adequate provision. Mailing in a timely manner, having the label
read to the consumer over the telephone with selections from prerecorded topics, or disclosing that health-care providers are an
additional source of the information would be deemed adequate.'
82

Id.

83

Id.

Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Guidance for Industry (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/

1804fnl.htm>.
85See .
SSee id.
See i&.

86
87

88

Id.
See id.
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If the "advertisement is presented in a foreign language," the
advertisements, as well as any brochures, websites, toll-free telephone
numbers, recorded messages, and operators should all present
information "in the language of the broadcast."" The Guidance for
Industry recognizes that the current regulations require
dissemination of product labeling in English. 9 The FDA, however,
encourages sponsors to provide "consumers with nonpromotional
consumer-friendly product information in the language of the
broadcast [advertisement].""' The FDA also has encouraged sponsors
who use the adequate provision mechanisms to collect relative data
on consumer use to make known "research relating to the overall
effects" of direct-to-consumer promotions on the public health. 9
The standards of the various federal regulations fit well with the
conclusions of the court in Perez if the court's avoidance of the New
Jersey Legislature's learned intermediary language is accepted. Title
2A, section 58G-4 of the New Jersey Statutes requires the
manufacturer, seller, or sponsor to give an adequate warning. The
statute provides that the warning is adequate if it is one that a
reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances
would have provided with respect to the danger and that
communicates adequate information on the dangers and safe use
of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the
ordinary knowledge common to, the persons by whom the
product is intended to be used.93
Contrast this approach with section 6 of the Restatement
(Third), which similarly imposes liability on a prescription drug or
medical device manufacturer that gives inadequate instructions or
warnings. 9 Section 6 also requires reasonable instructions and
warnings to be given to a patient if a manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings. 5 The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) state the
arguments for and against liability imposed against manufacturers for

89

Id.

See Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Guidance for Industry (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
1804fnl.htm>.
91 Id.
9

Id.

93

N.J. STAT.

ANN § 2A.:58C-4 (West 1999).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIy § 6(b) (3) (1997).
See id. § 6(d) (2).
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direct-to-consumer advertising. 96
The NewJersey Supreme Court, through its holding in Perez, has
chosen to join what had previously been a limited rule established
only within Massachusetts," Oklahoma (as interpreted by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals), 9s and Michigan (as interpreted by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan)."
New Jersey federal courts, however, had previously rejected this rule
when interpreting New Jersey state law.'
Given the Reporters'
comments, however, liability clearly is not beyond the intent of the
Restatement (Third).
The federal regulation sets forth a detailed requirement and
contains precise definitions of terms used both in the regulation and
in the Guidance to Industry.'0 ' For example, ingredient information
must be stated without intervening material. 2 The regulations
See id. § 6(d) (2) cmt. e.
See McDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass. 1985)
("The
narrow issue ... is whether ... a manufacturer of birth control pills owes a direct
duty to the consumer to warn her of the dangers inherent in the use of the pill. We
concluded that such a duty exists under the law of this Commonwealth.").
See Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 116 F.3d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir.
1997)
(interpreting Oklahoma law regarding the duty to warn of dangers associated with
nicotine patches). The Tenth Circuit certified the duty to warn issue to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 299 (Okla.
1997) ("Compliance with FDA warning requirements does not necessarily satisfy the
manufacturer's common law duty to warn the consumer.").
99 See Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867,
878-79 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (applying
Michigan law, but limiting its holding to oral contraceptives only).
100 See Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.J. 1988)
(applying the learned intermediary rule with respect to contraceptives). In Spychala,
Judge Barry specifically wrote:
Although a woman may be actively involved in the decision to use
contraceptives, those contraceptives are administered only by
prescription and upon the advice of a physician .... There is no
reason apparent to me to differentiate between contraceptives and
other prescription drugs to which the learned intermediary rule
applies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101 See 21 C.F.RL § 202.1 (1990).
102 See id. § 202.1(a) (1).
For example, the listing of ingredients in an
advertisement must be in the same order as on the label of the product, and quantity
information must similarly correspond. See id. § 202.1(a)(2). The advertisement
may not imply ostensible proprietary names for the drug or any ingredient implying
a unique effectiveness or composition when the ingredient is a common substance.
See id. § 202.1(a)(3). In addition, inactive ingredients cannot be listed to imply a
value "greater than their true functional role"; a drug or ingredient cannot be called
by a proprietary name similar in spelling or pronunciation with an established name
of a different drug or ingredient. Id. § 202.1 (a) (4)-(5).
97
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further treat in detail exactly how proprietary names may be used.'0
If there is an established name for a drug, its printing is minutely
regulated.' 4 Descriptions of drugs with multiple active ingredients
are also regulated.' 5 Importantly, the regulation requires a true
statement of information in the "brief summary" listing the sideeffects, contraindications, and effectiveness of the drugs. Separate
provisions are made for reminder advertisements, advertisements of
bulk-sale drugs, and advertisements of prescription-compounding
drugs.
Title 21, § 202.1(e)(3) of the Code of Federal Regulations
clearly states:
The requirement of a true statement of information relating to
side-effects, contraindications and effectiveness applies to the
entire advertisement. Untrue or misleading information in any
part of the advertisement will not be corrected by the inclusion in
another distinct part of the advertisement of the brief statement
containing
true
information
relating
to side-effects,
contraindications and effectiveness of the drug.106
The regulation is also applicable to the "theme of the advertiser."' 7 If
part of either the advertisement or its theme is misleading by reason
of an omission of an appropriate qualification of pertinent
information, that part or theme must include an appropriate
qualification.'0 Information may be concise if it is supplemented by a
permanent reference on each page to the presence of the location of
the complete discussion.' 9 Furthermore, any claim of effectiveness
must include specific indications for use of the drug or particular
purposes claimed in the advertisement."0 For example, if the drug is
an antibacterial agent, the advertisement must name a type or types
of infections and microorganisms for which the drug is clinically
effective, as required, approved, or permitted in the drug-package
labeling. The same is true as to side effects and contraindications,
except that the particulars may be limited to those pertinent to the
indications for which the drug is recommended or suggested in the
advertisement.
The "brief summary" requirement is governed by the same
103

104
105

106
107

See id. § 202.1(b).

See id.
See id. § 202.1(c).
Id. § 202.1(e) (3) (i).
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3)(i) (1990).

108 See id.
"09 See id.
110

See id. § 202.1(e) (3) (ii).
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permitted-labeling standard as new drug applications, and claims of
increased or new effectiveness are also as sharply scrutinized. All
require that each be a "true statement." The definition of a "true
statement" in the "brief summary" and elsewhere appears in the
negative in the text of title 21, § 202.1 (e) (5) of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which states that an advertisement does not "present a
'true statement' of information in [its] brief summary relating to side
effects, contraindications, or effectiveness" if it is false or misleading
with respect to these properties, or if it fails to present a fair balance
between information relating to these properties."'
Claims of
effectiveness, safety, side effects, and contraindications must be of
comparable depth and detail."2 The statement must reveal both facts
material in light of its representations and consequences that may
result from the use of the drug recommended or suggested in the
advertisement."' There are twenty paragraphs of examples, samples
of which are an unfair balance of information, representations, or
suggestions not approved or permitted for use in the labeling
concerning effectiveness, misleading drug comparisons, or
comparisons based on outmoded favorable data, conclusions from
nonclinical studies when no such clinical significance has been
demonstrated, the use of statistics to arrive from pooling data from
insignificant or dissimilar studies, and the use of headlines and
pictorial or other graphic matter in a way that is misleading." 4 A
provision of this subsection may be waived with respect to a specified
advertisement only via a written communication from the FDA on
petition of a party adversely affected by enforcement of the
provision."* The party still must show that the advertisement is not
false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading or violative of
the statute." 6 These standards themselves
are defined in additional
7
sections that limit the FDA's discretion."
Any new product information that comes to the attention of the
FDA or the manufacturer, and which is not generally known to
prescribing health-care providers, must also be subject to a new
publicity program and shall be put in all advertisements if the FDA

I Id. § 202.1(e) (5).
"1
"13

4
115
116
''7

See id. § 202.1(e) (5) (ii).
See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (5) (iii) (1990).
Seemid. § 202.1(e) (6) (i)-(xx).
See id.
See id.
See id. § 202.1(e) (7) (i)-(xiii).
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Commissioner so directs."" If an adequate program is not being
1 9 These
followed, preapproval will be required of any such publicity.
actions are in addition to the Commissioner's rights to notify the
public of the problem, suspend any new drug application, decertify
any antibiotic, or recommend any regulatory action.'2
Importantly, there is a safe-harbor provision if the sponsor has
sought FDA comment before running the advertisement and has
complied with the FDA's suggestions.12 ' A failure to seek such
comment leaves a sponsor to proceed at its peril.
Thus, the general guidelines of the Guidance to Industry can
provide the casual observer with an overview of direct-to-consumer
advertising. Any particular advertisement that will be challenged in
court, however, must first be examined to see if the FDA provided
any preliminary favorable comment or must be assessed anew against
the specific standards of title 21, § 202.1 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. It is this scrutiny that apparently moved the Perez court
to find that the presumption of adequacy applies when the
manufacturer has complied with the FDA's advertising and labeling
requirements, and to comment that in only the "rare case" will this
presumption be overcome.'
CONCLUSION

The Perez court had four basic options for establishing standards
for direct-to-consumer advertising. First, the court could have
adopted the New Jersey statutory language as it existed and
determined that an adequate warning, as defined in title 2A, section
58C-4 of the New Jersey Statutes, need be given solely to the
prescribing health-care provider. Second, the court could have
decided that the statute governed disclosure to a prescribing healthcare provider and limited a products liability cause of action. Under
this result, parallel fraud and misrepresentation claims would be
available through common-law standards for a consumer who had
relied upon deceptive advertising. Third, the court could have
avoided the statutory language, as the court did, but applied existing
common-law or statutory principles for failure to warn claims.
Fourth, the court could have taken the course that it took, avoiding
the New Jersey statutory language and engrafting the FDA standards
118 See id. § 202.10)(1).
19

120

See21 C.F.R. § 202.10)(1) (1990).

See id.

121

See id. § 202.1() (4).

1

See Perez, 161 N.J. at 25, 734 A.2d at 1259.
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as the basis of a new cause of action. Having chosen the fourth
course, the court, through the attendant enhanced presumption of
adequacy for compliance with the federal standards, has given with
one hand and taken back with the other. The New Jersey Supreme
Court's "compelling evidence," "virtually dispositive," and "rare case"
language indicates that seldom, if ever, will the inquiry proceed
beyond an analysis of compliance with the federal standards. This
effectively stifles any claim when there has been favorable FDA
comment and de facto clearance of the challenged advertisement.
Even when such comment is lacking, the
FDA regulations will provide
3
the standard of review for the courts.1
In effect, the ambiguous language of Feldman II has now been
explained, even as to an ordinary failure to warn claim involving a
prescription drug. Those who took delight in the court's rejection of
the preemption argument in Feldman 11 now find themselves faced
with this superpresumption of adequacy, subject to extremely
difficult, if any, rebuttal. Any fraud upon the FDA, of course, still is a
basis for an award of punitive damages, and "concealment or
nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects" may
still avoid the bar now imposed by compliance with FDA standards.24
Absent such fraud or concealment, however, it would be highly
unusual if a plaintiffs case is able to survive a motion for summary
judgment when there had been premarket approval or favorable FDA
comment concerning direct-to-consumer advertising.
For these
reasons, the exuberance of plaintiff attorneys over Perez should be
short-lived. Read properly, the Perez opinion is a victory for the
defense.
If the New Jersey Supreme Court intended otherwise, its next
opinion on this topic is eagerly awaited.' If history is any indication,
" See generally 21 C.F.R § 202.1 (1990).
Perez, 161 N.J. at 25, 734A.2d at 1259.
125 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, rendered an opinion in
:24

R.F. v. Abbott Laboratories that was withdrawn at the request of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, which will hear the case this year. See R-F. v. Abbott Labs., 158 N.J.
72, 726 A.2d 936 (1999) (granting certification). In RF., the plaintiff claims that the
defendant's HIV test was defective because it carried inadequate warnings. See Federal
Preemption, 17 No. 1 PROD. LIAB. L.& STRATEGY 7, July 1998, available in WESTLAW.
The defendant claims that because its warnings were approved by the FDA, the
plaintiff's case should be preempted. See id. The appellate division "agreed with
Abbott that the claim was preempted. ... 'and that the pretrial motions to dismiss
should have been granted on preemption grounds because it was undisputed that
the FDA specifically reviewed Abbott's package insert and approved it only after it
incorporated the changes the FDA had directed.'" Abbott HIlV Defense Verdict Affirmed
on Preemption by New Jersey Appellate Division, 3 No. 10 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: DRUGS &

MED. DEvicEs 14, May 22, 1998, available in WESTLAW (quoting the withdrawn
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however, it is unlikely that another state resolving this issue will go
beyond New Jersey's resolution of direct-to-consumer advertising
liability.
Lastly, one must consider whether this decision is a forerunner
of similar treatment to be afforded claims in other closely regulated
industries when there is no actual preemption by statute or
regulation. The New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning, coupled
with the standards of comment e to section 4(b) of the Restatement
(Third), may forecast the court's reluctance to reassess conduct or
products that have already passed stringent administrative review.

appellate division opinion).

